Review of “Knowledge, Possiblity and Consciousness” by Dunlop, Charles E. M.
Essays in Philosophy
Volume 4
Issue 2 Medical Research Ethics Article 9
6-2003
Review of “Knowledge, Possiblity and
Consciousness”
Charles E. M. Dunlop
The University of Michigan-Flint
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Essays in Philosophy is a biannual journal published by Pacific University Library | ISSN 1526-0569 | http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/
Recommended Citation
Dunlop, Charles E. M. (2003) "Review of “Knowledge, Possiblity and Consciousness”," Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 4: Iss. 2, Article 9.
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/dunloprev.html[9/18/2009 5:06:45 PM]
Essays in Philosophy
A Biannual Journal
Vol. 4 No. 2, June 2003
Book Review
Knowledge, Possiblity and Consciousness, by John Perry. Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press,
2001. 221 + xvi pages (including index and notes). ISBN: 0-262-16199-0. 
John Perry offers a spirited and sophisticated defense of physicalism against three well-known “neo-
dualist” challenges, which are outlined in the first chapter. On stage are the zombie argument, the
knowledge argument, and the modal argument. Having locked onto these primary targets, Perry devotes
the next two chapters to outlining the basic tenets of his own view (which he calls “antecedent
physicalism”), and in the remainder of the book he develops his responses to the opposition.
In contrast to older mind-brain identity theories, which identified all mental state types with
physical types, Perry follows a more recent distinction between “psychological” and “phenomenal”
aspects of mind. He favors a functionalist treatment of psychological states (e.g., beliefs) not
essentially involving any subjective elements; the nature of psychological states is encapsulated by
the roles that they play. However, phenomenal states (e.g., pains), which have essential subjective
characters or “qualia”, require a different account, and here’s where Perry’s identity theory enters
the picture: phenomenal states, he argues, are brain states. This type-identity claim carries with it a
commitment to some degree of “neural chauvinism” – the view that only beings physically like us
are capable of having the same phenomenal states that we enjoy – but Perry is willing to live with
that. Anyway, as he notes, it doesn’t follow that extraterrestrials, robots, etc. could have no
phenomenal states at all; rather theirs, if they had any, would just be different from ours.
Antecedent physicalism combines a number of commonsense ideas about experience with the claim
that experiential states are (types of) physical states. Most important, phenomenal states are both
causes and effects; they have subjective characters; they may have functional roles, but are not
reducible to any such roles; and their nature is intrinsic, not determined by historical or contextual
properties. Incidentally, the term “antecedent physicalism” should not be taken to suggest some sort
of irreversibly entrenched dogma, but neither does it mark a position of ontological neutrality. Since
neo-dualist arguments purport to show that physicalism is inadequate, Perry’s strategy is to start by
embracing physicalism, and from there to assess whether neo-dualist considerations require it to be
abandoned.
David Chalmers’ version of the zombie argument provides the first test. In a nutshell, it introduces a
possible world, physically identical to ours – complete with exact duplicates of human bodies – but
lacking qualia. On the supposition that a world physically identical to ours could lack phenomenal
states, the zombie argument concludes that subjective experience must be nonphysical. Now, it
seems obvious that antecedent physicalists should reject this reasoning in the following way:
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subjective states are physical states; therefore a world physically identical to ours would contain
phenomenal experiences; therefore the imagined zombie world is impossible. In short, from the
perspective of antecedent physicalism, zombie scenarios beg the question.
Strangely, although Perry later endorses this point in passing, it is not the one that he actually
employs against the possibility of zombie worlds. Instead, he focuses on antecedent physicalism’s
principle that phenomenal states are causally efficacious. He then proceeds to argue against the
possibility of zombie worlds on the grounds that, absent phenomenal states, those worlds would
lack the (physical) effects caused by phenomenal states in our world, and consequently no zombie
world would be physically identical to the actual world. For example, assuming that the chocolaty
and sugary qualia I get from biting into a Mrs. Field’s cookie cause me to say, “That treat was
delicious”, a world in which my zombie counterpart ate such a cookie would fail to contain the
same utterance (or if the zombie utterance did occur, causes other than qualia would be
responsible). For this reason Perry concludes that a world lacking qualia would differ physically
from ours, contrary to what the zombie argument supposes.
Why does Perry confront the zombie argument in such a convoluted way, given the availability of
the more straightforward reply outlined two paragraphs back? The answer is that he thinks that
zombie possibilities aren’t fundamentally about physicalism vs. dualism. Rather, he holds that a
commitment to epiphenomenalism would permit either dualists or physicalists to countenance the
possibility of zombies. According to Perry, Chalmers’ zombie world is impossible because “the
antecedent physicalist believes in the efficacy of the conscious and rejects epiphenomenalism” (p.
72). But in order to show that physicalists and dualists are in the same boat here, Perry has to do
some fancy footwork. First he introduces the notion of physicalist epiphenomenalists, for whom
phenomenal states are “physical nomological danglers”. Moreover, he acknowledges that physicalist
epiphenomenalists cannot allow for the possibility of a zombie world differing from ours only with
respect to the effects of conscious states, for if conscious states are physical states then any world
physically identical to ours would have to include conscious states, whether or not they produced
any effects. So, Perry further proposes that a physicalist epiphenomenalist “can accept the
possibility of . . . zombie worlds . . . that are physically indiscernible [from ours] except for the
absence of the sensations” (p. 78, italics added). Unfortunately there is trouble for Perry here, as the
italicized phrase reveals. From the standpoint of physicalist epiphenomenalism, the re-characterized
zombie world isn’t Chalmers’ zombie world at all. Once this point is recognized, there’s no reason
to suppose that epiphenomenalism is the central culprit in the zombie argument; Perry can’t get that
result by appealing to a zombie world that is physically distinguishable from the actual world in
some respects. However, prior to introducing epiphenomenalist considerations, Perry already had all
that he needed to disallow Chalmers’ zombie scenario. Since antecedent physicalism maintains that
phenomenal states are brain states, it follows that any possible world physically identical to ours
will automatically preclude zombies, and this point is independent of any causal powers that
phenomenal states might or might not have. Thus, it strikes me that antecedent physicalists should
forget about epiphenomenalism and instead reject the zombie argument simply because it
presupposes that experiential states are not brain states. In fact, that’s the very strategy Perry does
adopt in his reply to inverted-spectrum arguments.
Despite his dismissal of epiphenomenalism (in both physicalist and dualist versions), Perry at one
point makes a surprising concession to that doctrine. After imagining a situation in which he picks
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up a piece of red-hot charcoal, feels pain, and quickly drops the fiery coal, he writes:
It seems to me that the feeling of pain caused me to drop the charcoal. I may [be] wrong
about that. It may well be that I drop the charcoal, quite independently of the feeling of
pain; that the feeling of pain, and the release of the muscles that hold the charcoal, are
both caused by more immediate effects of the heat of the charcoal on my nervous
system, rather than the pain being the cause of the release, as it seems. There is no
reason for the antecedent physicalist to think that we are always right about what
conscious states cause.
(p. 76)
This is a perplexing comment from someone who, only two pages earlier, after describing the
experience of biting into a chocolate chip cookie, found it “simply incredible” that the taste
sensation didn’t cause him to voice his approval. It is hardly clear why the cookie example should
weigh against epiphenomenalism if the charcoal example doesn’t.
Perry devotes chapters four through seven to dissecting Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge
argument featuring Mary, the color scientist. Aficionados will recall that Mary, a scientific genius,
has spent all of her life in a monochromatic environment where she learned all there is to know
about the (completed) physics and neurophysiology of color perception. When she is released from
her room and spies a ripe tomato, she discovers something that she did not previously know;
namely, what it is like to experience red. Since prior to this moment Mary possessed all of the
physical facts concerning color, and since she has now learned something new, the argument
concludes that knowledge of what it is like to experience red cannot merely be knowledge of
physical facts.
There is a structural parallel between Perry’s treatment of this argument and his earlier discussion
of zombies. Once again he argues that the central issue is not dualism vs. physicalism, but rather an
underlying assumption that both positions might adopt. This time, however, Perry’s view is more
persuasive (for a caveat see the penultimate paragraph of this review). He contends that the
knowledge argument rests on an erroneous conception of knowledge and belief. The mistake
involves what Perry calls the “subject matter assumption” – that the content of a given belief is
constituted entirely by truth conditions governing what the belief is about. This makes content
independent of a representation system, and it raises a familiar puzzle about how identities can be
informative.
So it is with Mary. While in her room, she learned that people have subjective experiences,
including subjective experiences common to the perception of roses, fire engines, blood, etc. She
hadn’t had this experience herself, and she didn’t know what it was like. Following Perry, call this
subjective state “QR”. When Mary was subsequently shown a ripe tomato, and exclaimed, “Oh, so
this experience is QR”, her phrase “this experience” denoted QR. But then it appears that Mary’s
alleged discovery was no discovery at all, since Mary already knew that QR = QR. The knowledge
argument concludes that QR cannot be a physical state, for Mary possessed all physical knowledge
before seeing the tomato, and yet she has just learned something new.
Perry’s diagnosis of the situation contains many subtleties (canvassed in 75 pages), but the main
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idea is this. What Mary learned cannot be described adequately by focusing on what’s true of what
she learned about. It’s obviously true of QR that it is self-identical, and it’s also true that when
Mary first experienced red she was experiencing (something identical to) QR. On the subject matter
assumption, the content of Mary’s belief about QR is fixed by the facts about QR. The facts
concerning QR didn’t change when Mary first saw the tomato, and so it looks as if Mary didn’t
learn anything new about QR. Jackson takes this to show that the QR can’t be a physical property,
because Mary did learn something new. But Perry argues that physicalism is not the problem here.
Rather, the difficulty is with the subject matter assumption, which insists that the content of Mary’s
belief about QR while in her monochromatic environment is the same as the content of her belief
after seeing a red object. Perry contends that way of assigning content is seriously incomplete.
An example analogous to several of Perry’s will serve to introduce the proposed repair. Suppose
that you are on a backpacking trip in the wilderness (in pre-GPS days), and you become hopelessly
lost. You suddenly spy a map on the ground that has probably fallen out of some previous hiker’s
pocket. Gratefully unfolding it, you see an area marked with an “X”, and the notation “You are
here”. Unfortunately, though, this still doesn’t give you any idea of where you are. However,
suppose further that after wandering aimlessly for a while, you happen upon a kiosk erected by the
Forest Service; it contains a map – perhaps even identical to the one you found earlier – also with
an “X” and a corresponding legend. Unlike your previous discovery, this one is informative, but
how so? After all, immediately prior to noticing the kiosk, your perceptions were of the very same
place to which the new map’s “X” refers, so there’s only one location in question and it is
obviously self-identical. But you already knew that everything is self-identical, so what exactly
have you learned? As Perry emphasizes, your new knowledge cannot be described by concentrating
exclusively on the referent of “here”; equally important is your newfound ability to link your
perceptions of your surroundings with what the map says. You didn’t learn that you were in a new
place; rather, you gained a new way of identifying the very same place (first as “the place where I
am now standing”, and subsequently as “the place designated by the ‘X’ on the kiosk map”).
Needless to say, this point has nothing to do with dualism vs. physicalism.
The wilderness example applies to Mary as follows. On Perry’s analysis, the knowledge argument
conflates (a) two different ways of knowing the same thing, and (b) knowing two different things.
As was the case with you and the kiosk map, Mary didn’t learn a new nonphysical fact; rather, she
acquired a new way of knowing a previously mastered physical fact. She gained recognitional
knowledge, expressible as “QR is this subjective character”, and her new knowledge was not the
subject matter content that QR = QR. To capture the wanted notion, Perry develops an account of
what he calls “reflexive content”. This approach treats knowledge in terms of situated agents rather
than simply as sets of propositions characterized independently of a representation scheme. Thus it
includes, not just conditions on an object that is represented, but further conditions on an
individual’s representations, including the contexts in which they occur. In ignoring agents’
perspectives, the subject matter assumption adheres to a false doctrine of objectivity, according to
which “there is some kind of knowledge that involves grasping a fact not from any point of view –
a view from nowhere” (p. 166). However as Perry aptly remarked earlier, “The view from nowhere
is not a view at all” (p. 138). And antecedent physicalists are not committed to it. In rejecting the
subject matter assumption, physicalists can also reject the claim that Mary could have known
everything about a red experience prior to having one. Moreover, Perry argues that if dualists
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adhered to the subject matter assumption, they too would have a major problem in explaining
Mary’s new knowledge.
Perry’s final chapter addresses Saul Kripke’s modal argument against the type identity of sensations
and brain states (a similar one has also been used by Chalmers). Although mind-brain identity
theses were traditionally put forth as contingent identities, Kripke has convincingly argued that
identities are necessary. However, as Kripke also notes, it seems that one can coherently deny that
sensations (e.g., pains) are brain states. If those denials point to a real possibility of nonidentity,
then mind-brain identity doesn’t hold for sensations, since the identity – if it holds at all – is
necessary. Identity theorists might answer this by retreating to the claim that denials of identity here
aren’t really coherent after all, and any appearance of their being so is explainable as an illusion.
Kripke considers various moves along that dimension, and argues that they fail. But if the relation
between sensations and brain states really is contingent, there can be no identity.
In responding to Kripke, Perry grants that the mind-brain identity at issue is necessary, and he
offers an alternative account of why it appears to be contingent. Perry has a number of interesting
things to say about this, but the core idea again relies on the distinction between subject matter
content and reflexive content, along with a corresponding distinction between what is possible and
what is conceivable. At the subject matter level, experiential states are brain states, and there is no
possibility that they aren’t. But at the level of reflexive content, an agent’s concept of subjective
states may fail to link up with his concept of brain states even though they in fact denote the same
thing, and in circumstances when the linkage fails it will be conceivable to him that there is no
identity. Clearly, this point cannot be made simply by modeling the world(s) in which terms for
various experiences and brain states denote the same thing, but reflexive content goes beyond that
by modeling the way in which agents represent the world. As Perry puts it, “We need knowledge
that reflects not just the way things are among themselves, but also how they are for us, how the
ideas in our heads are connected to the subject matter they represent” (p. 176). It is at this epistemic
level that the illusion of contingency finds its explanation.
Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness is a stimulating and lucid volume that breathes new life
into a type-identity theory for qualia. Serious argumentation is leavened by frequent humorous
lines, perhaps reflecting the book’s origin as the 1999 Nicod Lectures. Perry’s distinction between
“subject matter” and “reflexive” content is obviously at the center of his defense of antecedent
physicalism, and it is tempting to wonder whether the latter might be in principle reducible to the
former. Perry’s response to any such suggestion is clearly negative, and he may well be right, but
then additional perplexities naturally arise. For example, Perry allows (1) that Mary did acquire a
new belief, and he argues (2) that her new belief cannot be accounted for in terms of subject matter
content. In order to accommodate both claims, he counts new reflexive content as new belief
content. Although Perry’s use of reflexive content here is undeniably significant and powerful, he
acknowledges that its introduction requires jettisoning standard accounts of “what is believed”. But
do new reflexive contents really yield new beliefs or new knowledge? This and surrounding matters
would benefit from further exploration. Finally, it should be mentioned that the index to the book is
rather sparse; there are entries for “Raquel Welch”, “Reno, Nevada”, and “orgasm”, but none for
such important specialized notions as “concepts”, “notions”, and “perceptual buffers”.
I am grateful to Candace Bolter and Nathan Oaklander for helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this review.
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